Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning by Gibbs, Raymond W.
Raymond W. Gibbs
Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr.
University of California, Santa Cruz
Department of Psychology
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
USA
gibbs@ucsc.edu
Abstract
An important claim in cognitive science is that much of everyday cognition and lan-
guage has its roots in ongoing bodily experience. One place where embodiment is
critical is in the creation and use of metaphoric talk. This article describes some of
the studies from experimental psychology and corpus linguistics demonstrating how
metaphoric ideas and talk emerge from embodied simulation processes where people
imagine themselves engaging in the actions mentioned in the language (e. g., “grasp the
concept”). Some of this newer work demonstrates how experimental studies can test
ideas from linguistics, but that corpus studies can also be used to examine falsiVable
hypotheses Vrst seen in psychology, on the embodied nature of metaphoric meaning.
1 Introduction
Embodied metaphor refers to the idea that many metaphoric concepts are grounded
in recurring patterns of bodily experience (Gibbs, 2006; LakoU & Johnson, 1999). For
example, both “I am struggling to get a good start in my career” and “My marriage is on
the rock” refers to the concept that LIFE IS A JOURNEY. People’s journey experiences,
where they start at some source point, follow a path, and end up at some goal or
destination, are used to better structured more abstract concepts like life or career or
relationship. Much research in cognitive linguistics shows the importance of embodied
source domains in metaphoric ideas and talk.
To a signiVcant extent, the experimental research on embodied metaphor is seen as
veriVcation for cognitive linguistic theories of embodied metaphor. But the rise of new
work in corpus linguistics now sets the stage for a diUerent kind of interdisciplinary
collaboration between linguists and psychologists. This paper presents one example of
this interaction between experimental psychology and corpus linguistics on the topic of
embodied metaphor. My aim is to demonstrate some of the ways these two Velds can be
integrated; especially in regard to testing speciVc potentially falsiVable hypotheses.
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2 Experimental Studies on Embodied Metaphor
Many psycholinguistic studies have been conducted over the last 25 years to explore the
ways that embodied metaphors may be recruited during people’s use and understanding
of metaphoric language (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). These varied psychological Vndings,
collected using a variety of experimental methods, indicate that the metaphorical map-
pings between embodied source domains and abstract target domains partly motivate
people’s understanding of the speciVc Vgurative meanings of many conventional and
novel metaphors.
For example, some experiments examined how immediate bodily experience inWu-
ence metaphor interpretations. In one series of studies on metaphorical talk about time,
students waiting in line at a café were given the statement “Next Wednesday’s meeting
has been moved forward two days” and then asked “What day is the meeting that has
been rescheduled?” (Borodistky & Ramscar, 2002). Students who were farther along
in the line (i. e., who had thus very recently experienced more forward spatial motion)
were more likely to say that the meeting had been moved to Friday, rather than to Mon-
day. Similarly, people riding a train were presented the same ambiguous statement and
question about the rescheduled meeting. Passengers who were at the end of their jour-
neys reported that the meeting was moved to Friday signiVcantly more than did people
in the middle of their journeys. Although both groups of passengers were experienc-
ing the same physical experience of sitting in a moving train, they thought diUerently
about their journey and consequently responded diUerently to the rescheduled meeting
question. These results suggest how ongoing sensorimotor experience has an inWuence
on people’s comprehension of metaphorical statements about time.
One idea that has attracted a good deal of attention in cognitive science is the pos-
siblity that much cognition and language is organized around embodied simulation pro-
cesses (Gibbs, 2006). Several diUerent behavioral studies provide support for the view
that embodied simulations play some role in people’s immediate processing of verbal
metaphors (Gibbs, 2006). People may create partial embodied simulations of speak-
ers’ metaphorical messages that involve moment-by-moment “what must it be like”
processes that make use of ongoing tactile-kinesthetic experiences (Gibbs, 2006). Un-
derstanding abstract, metaphorical events, such as “grasping the concept,” for example,
is constrained by aspects of people’s embodied experience as if they are immersed in
the discourse situation, even when these events can only be metaphorically and not
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physically realized (i. e., it is not physically possible to grasp an abstract entity such as a
“concept”).
For instance, people’s speeded comprehension of metaphorical phrases, like “grasp
the concept” are facilitated when they Vrst make, or imagine making, a relevant bod-
ily action, such as a grasping motion (Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). One unique study re-
vealed that people walked further toward a target when thinking about a metaphorical
statement “Your relationship was moving along in a good direction” when the con-
text ultimately suggested a positive relationship than when the scenario alluded to a
negative, unsuccessful relationship (Gibbs, 2012). This same diUerence, however, was
not obtained when people read the nonmetaphorical statement “Your relationship was
very important” in the same two scenarios. People appear to partly understand the
metaphorical statement from building an embodied simulation relevant to LOVE RE-
LATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS, such that they bodily imagine taking a longer journey
with the successful relationship than with the unsuccessful one.
A diUerent set of experiments examined people’s understanding of the embodied
metaphor TIME IS MOTION by Vrst asking people to read Vctive motion sentences, as in
“The tattoo runs along his spine” (Matlock, Ramscar, & Boroditsky, 2005). Participants
read each Vctive motion statement or a sentence that did not imply Vctive motion (e. g.,
“The tattoo is next to the spine”), and then answered the “move forward” question (e. g.,
“The meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two
days.”). People gave signiVcantly more Friday than Monday responses after reading the
Vctive motion expressions, but not the non-Vctive motion statements. These results
implies that people inferred TIME IS MOTION conceptual metaphor when reading the
Vctive motion expressions which primed their interpretation of the ambiguous “move
forward” question.
A follow-up group of studies had people engage in abstract motion to see if it in-
Wuenced their responses to the “move forward” questions (Matlock et al., 2011). Par-
ticipants Vrst Vlled in the missing numbers in an array that either went in ascending
(e. g., between 5 and 17) or descending (e. g., between 17 and 5) order. When the partici-
pants then answered the “move forward” question, they gave far more Friday responses
after Vlling in the numbers for the ascending condition and gave more Monday answers
having just Vlled in the numbers for the descending order condition. People appear to
understand the meaning of time metaphors through a mental simulation of the implied
motion, Vndings that are congruent with the claim that conceptual metaphors are active
parts of verbal metaphor processing.
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These diUerent behaviorial studies oUer support for cognitive linguistic claims about
embodied metaphor, but do so in a more systematic manner that allows for speciVc
hypotheses to be tested, and possible falisVed.
3 Psycholinguistics and Corpus Linguistic Studies
The experimental studies reviewed above all employed constructed examples, following
most cognitive linguistic work on embodied metaphor. But there is now more emphasis
in linguistics on corpus studies examining the use of metaphor in naturalistic discourse.
For example, read the words path and road when they are used in the two diUerent
metaphorical contexts below, and consider whether they convey the same meaning
(Johansson-Falck & Gibbs, 2012):
1. The Spaniard lost 10–8 6–3 2–6 8–6 to Charlie Pasarell in 1967. And even if Agassi
survives his Vrst test, his path to a second successive Vnal is strewn with trip wire,
with former champions Boris Becker and Michael Stich top seed Pete Sampras
and powerful ninth seeded Dutchman Richard Krajicek all in his half of the draw.
[emphasis ours]
2. The learner who is well on the road to being a competent reader does bring a
number of things to the task, a set of skills and attributes many of which are still
developing. He or she brings good sight and the beginnings of visual discrimina-
tion. [emphasis ours]
The meaning of path may be appropriate in (1) because of the uneven nature of
Agassi’s journey toward winning the tennis match, while road seems apt in (2) be-
cause the journey becoming a competent reader’s is well-established, and one that
many people have metaphorically travelled. Previous corpus linguistic studies show
that metaphorical uses of path, road, as well as way, are not only structured according
to primary/conceptual metaphors such as action is motion, life/a purposeful activ-
ity is a journey, and purposes are destinations, but also appear to be inWuenced by
people’s embodied experiences with the speciVc concepts that these terms refer to in
their non-metaphorical uses (Johansson Falck, 2010). Thus, both similarities and dif-
ferences between real world paths, roads and ways are reWected by how metaphorical
paths, roads and ways are described both by the kinds and frequencies of obstacles that
people face on these journeys, and the kinds of actions people engage in, on, or near
metaphorical paths, roads or ways.
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Johansson-Falck and Gibbs (2012) conducted two studies, one a psychological ques-
tionnaire and the second a corpus linguistic investigation to see if embodied simulation
processes are also prominent in people’s use and understanding of expressions like his
path to a second successive Vnal is strewn with trip wire in reference to Agassi’ metaphor-
ical journey to a tennis tournament championship as seen in (1) above. Thus, people’s
embodied simulation in regard to their imaginative understandings of traveling along
diUerent paths and roads provides a major constraint on what gets mapped in various
metaphorical instances of path and road.
A Vrst study investigated people’s experiences with paths and roads. Participants
were given a booklet that Vrst asked them to create a mental image of “being on a path”
and then, on the next page, to form a mental image of “being on a road.” Following this,
the participants turned the page and saw a series of questions, each of which could be
answered by circling either the word path or road. Analysis of participants’ responses
revealed the following qualities that people strongly felt they experienced along paths
and roads.
Paths
Something you travel on by foot
More up and down
More aimless in their direction
Something you stop on more often
More problematic to travel on
Roads
Straighter
Wider
Paved
Lead to a speciVc destination
Something you drive on
Overall, the results of this Vrst study employing human participants demonstrated
that people’s imaginative perceptions of paths and roads focus on the more central
rather than peripheral aspects of their bodily actions relevant to these real-world arti-
facts (e. g. on driving, but not walking, on roads, and on walking, but not driving, on
paths etc.). Traveling along paths is clearly diUerent in important ways from that of
roads.
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A second study in this series provided a detailed corpus analysis of 240 metaphorical
of path and and 47 instances of road in the British National Corpus. Most generally, the
corpus Vndings matched the intuitions we obtained in our Vrst psychological study. For
instance, path was frequently used to talk of more diXcult, and varied, diXculties in
travel in these contexts (23 %), but roads were never used in this way. On the other
hand, only 12 % of the path examples, but 60 % (based on only 3 of 5 instances) of the
road instances included explicit mention about where the artifact leads (i. e. to eternity,
to ruin, to stardom). The same diUerences are seen in the ways that path and road are
used to describe the target domain of purposeful activities/lives. Again, there were
many more mentions of the diXculties associated with travel along paths (38 %) than
roads (13 %). These diXculties may be related to obstacles in or on the path/road (e. g.,
their path to a winning was obstructed by an excellent performance from India, or the
constant traps and barriers laid by the forces that would block our path and drag us down),
or they correspond to a diXcult area that someone or something is leaving or trying
to leave e. g., ([people] seek a path out of divisive ideological camps, or break though the
barriers of error to seek the road to truth).
Paths, but not roads, are connected with choices between alternative courses of ac-
tion. 21 % of the path instances with the function of describing purposeful activi-
ties/lives, but none of the road cases included words or phrases suggesting that there
may be more than one path to achieve a goal (e. g. only, best, the same, typical, a diUerent
path to the same goal).The term road, on the other hand, is more often used in talk about
activities that people want to be eXcient than paths (e. g., purposeful activity/life
and Vnancial/political developments/processes), and paths are more often used to de-
scribe actions or developments that may have a more hesitant, aimless, or step by step,
quality than roads (e. g., courses of action/ways of living, other types of develop-
ment and paths in computer/mathematics developments/processes. Path is used in
talk about processes and road in talk about ends of processes and result. Finally, path
is more closely connected to choices between diUerent courses of action, compared to
the much more eXcient and single goal-oriented road.
The link between people’s imaginative understandings of paths and roads and the
metaphorical uses of path and road in discourse has several theoretical implications.
First, people mentally simulate diUerent kinds of actions in journeys along paths and
roads and apply these experiences to shape their in-the-moment metaphorical under-
standings of abstract actions through the use of path and road. Second, the consistent
patterns of Vndings for the psychological survey and the corpus investigation suggest
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that metaphorical language including terms that refer to artifacts is to some signiVcant
extent predictable. Most importantly, our combination of a psychological investiga-
tion of people’s experiences of paths and roads with an extensive corpus analysis of
metaphorical path and road shows that neither a conceptual metaphor theory explana-
tion in terms of mappings at the levels of primary or complex metaphor, nor a purely
social theory in which the use of path and road are negotiated between speakers, suf-
Vciently account for the link between metaphorical meaning, mind and world. Instead,
people’s imaginative perceptions of paths or roads are inWuenced by their understand-
ings of these artifacts through embodied experience, which can then be simulated in the
context of metaphoric thinking and speaking.
4 Conclusion
There is a large body of both experimental and corpus linguistic work on the embod-
ied nature of many metaphoric concepts. The studies described in this article show how
experimental and corpus research can nicely feed one another to create hypotheses that
can be tested using either experimental or corpus linguistic methods. More speciVcally,
cognitive linguistic studies strongly suggest that people’s recurring bodily experiences
critically motivate aspects of their metaphoric talk. Psycholinguistic studies conVrm
that diUerent sensorimotor experiences directly shape people’s use and understanding
of various metaphorical statements. But the psycholinguistic work is limited in testing
people’s immediate understanding of individual metaphors and does not explore the
role of embodiment in larger discourse contexts. However, recent corpus linguistic re-
search has demonstrated how speciVc hypotheses can be tested by examining detailed
patterns of metaphoric language use within naturalistic speech and text (also see Ste-
fanowitsch, 2011). This work shows that the metaphorical uses of certain words is not
simply a social process or accomplished via the direct activation of encoded primary or
conceptual metaphors. Instead, similar to the experimental research, corpus linguistic
methods are capable of revealing the constraining presences of embodied simulation
processes in the ways people think and speak of diUerent abstract, and in this case
metaphorical, concepts. In this way, then, corpus linguistic analyses do not simply oUer
ideas for possible testing using behavioral methods, but can be the site of testing explicit
hypotheses themselves.
Embodied experience seems critical to people’s use and understanding of metaphoric
idea and language, a conclusion that vastly diUers from traditional disembodied theo-
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ries of metaphorical meaning and language use. Of course, many other factors, ranging
from purely linguistic, social and cultural processes also shape the creation and inter-
pretation of metaphoric discourse. But it is unlikely that any of these forces can act
alone, apart from the inWuence of bodily activity. The studies described in this article
provide additional evidence that the embodied nature of metaphoric concepts is best
characterized in terms of embodied simulation hypotheses in which people imagine
themselves engaged in the actual events mentioned in the language, even when these
involves actions that are physically impossible to perform in the real world.
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